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The urban and industrial transformation of South Africa is commonly considered to
have begun with the discoveries of diamonds in 1867 and of gold in 1886. Among
the components of that transformation were the reorientations on two occasions of
the economies of the coastal colonies of the Cape and Natal towards 'emerging
economic centres of gravity1 at Kimberley and Johannesburg.(1) The diversion to
the interior of capital investment in the late nineteenth century has been paral-
leled by the focus of much late twentieth century historiography, which has -
with exceptions (2) - been concerned more with events after than before the open-
ing of the Witwatersrand gold fields, and which has seldom explored the economic
conditions prevailing in the coastal colonies prior to that moment. It seems to
be taken for granted that the mineral 'discoveries' should have been followed by
so unusual a reorientation of the pre-existing geography: not once,' but twice:
first to the diamond fields, then to the Transvaal. The geological occurrence or
geographical location of minerals substitutes for explanation of movements of
money, people and materials.(3) Yet as Atmore and Marks hinted, following a theme
suggested by Blainey, minerals were discovered 'by no means entirely acci-
dentally' at particular moments in the sixties and the eighties.(4) The timing
and the geography of the economic expansions of which mineral discoveries and
development formed a part are subjects which both history and historical
geography have left uncharted.
This paper is concerned with the economic conditions prevailing in the Cape
Colony in the early eighties, immediately prior to the opening of the Witwaters-
rand mines. Its first section charts the course of recession from 1881 to 1886.
The remainder of the paper considers the consequences of the depression in the
Cape Colony and its association with certain other factors in South African
development at the time. Its last two sections analyse the various forces, aris-
ing before and during the recession, which both encouraged and opposed northward
expansion from the Cape Colony.
The Course of Recession
By 1879 the concentration of claims was proceeding rapidly in all the Kimber-
ley diamond mines. For example, the 1600 claimholders of Kimberley mine had been
reduced to 300 between 1872 and 1877. Of these, twenty, mainly diamond merchants,
owned half the claims. A number of companies were formed. One, the Cape of Good
Hope Diamond Mining Company, was floated publicly in Port Elizabeth in September
1879. Its capital of flOO 000 was subscribed locally by merchants.(5)
Most of the initial capital for diamond company formation came from two sourc-
es in the Cape: claimowners, merchants and professionals in Kimberley, and the
established commercial community of the rest of the colony, through whom funds
from outlying areas were channeled. (6) The method of company flotation was highly
inflationary and claim values were boosted for speculative purposes. By the end
of 1880 some twenty companies had been formed, but the 'share mania' really took
off in the first half of 1881. Over seventy companies were formed, mostly regis-
tered at Kimberley, and sharedealing took place in the stock exchange established
there in February that year. As speculation grew, shares were increasingly pur-
chased on credit advanced through the banks, 'the Cape of Good Hope Bank taking
the bulk of the business but being helped out with credit from the Standard
Bank'.(7)
Finally becoming disturbed at the inflationary conditions, the banks refused
to accept scrip as collateral in April 1881. From June the inflated share prices
began to fall, and with them they dragged down numerous people. Even experienced
Kimberley merchants like A.A. Rothschild were 'ruined', and it is hardly sur-
prising that large coastal firms were also reduced to insolvency by their overex-
tension on diamond shares. The best-known individual bankruptcy was that of A.R.
McKenzie, Cape Town stevedoring, a^ent. and building contractor. -Like many others..
he was unable to pay his bank bills. When the banks called in debts from such
speculators late in 1881 they were forced to declare insolvency. McKenzie had
lost £200 000; many others had lost lesser sums.(8)
These insolvencies, of course, reflect an enormous transfer of capital from a
large number of investors in the 'old' colony into the control of 'diamond mag-
nates' in Griqualand West. Over half of the £12 million capital invested in the
diamond mining industry by 1881 had been subscribed in the Cape Colony. (9) This
capital did not simply disappear, though that is no doubt how it appeared to
insolvent speculators in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. On the contrary, the mon-
ey facilitated both the enrichment of the magnates and their purchase of still
more claims. This concentration of wealth emphasised the redirection of capital
from the old colony to its new province, a process begun during the mineral pros-
pecting of the depression of the sixties, fostered by the capital investments
controlled by the colonial government, and completed by the subsequent
depression.
As early as the winter of 1880 Cape Town firms were facing severe financial
difficulties in increasing numbers. M.L. Bensusan and Co., Barry, Arnold and
Co., and several other merchant houses collapsed as the extension of easy credit
began to catch up with them. H. Fisher, of L. Alexander and Co., asked the Stand-
ard Bank to release him from liabilities for 'fictitious bills' and F. Smale, a
middle-sized draper, had to meet his creditors 'in consequence of the dullness of
business'.(10) Despite the rapidly growing speculation in shares - which of
course included those of suspect diamond companies - inflation helped to give an
appearance of buoyancy to trade. Normally cautious observers like the Standard
Bank's inspectors could comment in mid-1881 that
Recent failures in Cape Town afford evidence of the great desire Merchants
here exhibit in pushing trade, but there does not appear to have been much
in the shape of rash speculation in this place, and I believe business to be
fairly healthy.(11)
Predictions of prosperity proved to be illfounded, for by the second half of 1881
the bubble of diamond share mania had burst. The setback to trade caused by the
resulting insolvencies and bankruptcies combined with a number of other adverse
factors to precipitate a general commercial depression.
Several weaknesses had developed within the commercial system over the course
of the boom which came to an end in 1881. The maintenance of large wholesale
stocks in upcountry towns, a practice indulged in both by small inland and large
port merchants, was increasingly rendered unnecessary by the completion of tele-
graphs, particularly the cable to Europe, as well as the colony's railways. The
rapid execution of orders made possible by these new means of communication meant
that large quantities of unsold merchandise could build up in the warehouses of
some traders. The overstocking was made that much more embarrassing by the gen-
eral decline in trade with African polities and then by the sudden cessation of
wars involving British troops in southern Africa in 1881.(12)
The last general war in the Eastern borderlands of the Cape Colony, begun in
1877-78, was brought to a close by 1879. It was followed by the disarmament war
waged against the Basotho under Sprigg's government. Meanwhile, British troops
had been engaged, with a variety of allies, in the defeats of Zulu and Pedi poli-
ties in 1879. Following the defeat of the Pedi, the burghers of the Transvaal
rose against the unwanted British annexation of 1877. A British army sustained a
series of defeats on the Natal-Transvaal border, and the new Liberal government
entered into negotiations towards restoring the independence of the Tran-
svaal. (13) The effects on the economy of. the Cape were immediate. . ...... . .
The country had become so accustomed to war that the sudden cessation of
the struggle in the Transvaal embarrassed the mercantile community who had
accumulated large stocks in the expectation of its continuance. The embar-
rassment was augmented by the execution of indents previously arranged.(14)
As commercial stocks built up in the towns of the colony, merchants searched for
customers. The search was made more difficult by the losses sustained by their
prospective customers in the Kimberley share collapse. The agricultural situ-
ation was also bleak.
A variety of pressures had adversely affected the output and consequently the
exports of the Cape farms. Cape wool exports fell unevenly from 1873 onwards, and
their fall was not compensated by the increasing value of ostrich feathers or
other rural produce. Falling prices were dampening the production and marketing
of other commodities too. For example, during the seventies the prices of wheat
and flour had declined, and by the early eighties the Cape was importing three
quarters of a million pounds worth of these breadstuffs a year. If the decline in
wheat prices and the poor yield of the 1881 crop was injurious to Western Cape
farmers, the shrinkage in the Kimberley market for other Western Cape products -
wine, brandy, dried fruit - was equally damaging. Wine farmers who had specu-
lated in diamond scrip were especially hard hit by falling demand for Cape bran-
dy. (15) The local banks and merchants of Western Province towns like Paarl and
Worcester were forced to tighten their credit as they sustained losses through
insolvencies, in turn precipitating further individual crashes.
It was in the Western Province that the commercial crisis first became severe.
A contemporary observer remarked that
At first the brunt of the crisis was undoubtedly borne at Cape Town and in
the South Western Districts, where trade had been pushed with little dis-
cretion. Business at Port Elizabeth was relatively on a much sounder foot-
ing, the depression in fact, with few exceptions, left the position of the
merchant houses there virtually unimpaired.(16)
At this early stage of recession, business in the Eastern Province was less
severely affected than at Cape Town; wages reflected the regional difference,
remaining high at Port Elizabeth (Table 1). Insolvencies of merchants and farm-
ers during 1881 were concentrated in the Western Province and that part of the
colony was viewed as the 'weakest' well into 1882.(17) The price and quantity of
wool exports declined only slightly in 1882, and the banks and merchants contin-
ued to do relatively well in the East. (18) But this regional buoyancy was not to
last. A decline in foreign markets affected the Cape. The spread of staples -
wool, diamonds and ostrich feathers - was of little avail, for Cape wool was of
poor quality and luxuries tend to be early and severe casualties in slumps. The
'moderate recession1 in England and America in 1882-83 had an immediate and dev-
astating impact on diamond prices.(19)
While the spark to the Western Cape's commercial crisis of 1881 was the col-
lapse of diamond share mania, it is misleading to describe the depression as a
'diamond crisis' (as Schumann did).(20) The Cape's economy was less dependent on
diamonds than is usually believed.(21) Despite the gathering depression, Cape
exports rose in 1881 and 1882 (Table 2) But while 'continued prosperity' could be
reported in Kimberley in February 1882 amid a building boom and the installation
of electric light, 'stagnation of trade upon the Diamond Fields' had begun by
June.(22) The average price for diamonds from Griqualand West was about 30s. in
1882; in 1883 it dropped to below 23s.(23) In addition, mineowners faced diffi-
culties in recruiting labour, high costs of fuel for steam machinery and enormous
problems of falling .'reef'.in the mines (which are further discussed below). By
early 1883,
the course of the crisis . . . veered in a pronounced manner towards the Dia-
mond Fields.(24)
Sharpened competition in diamond mining led both to tightened control over
labour and to concentration of capital through the amalgamations of companies.
In the conflict between labour and capital, which was sharpened by the
depression, the latter asserted its dominance in part through compounding and the
manipulation of a hierarchical, racial and geographical division of labour.(25)
In the conflict between companies, the monopoly of power in Kimberley was brought
closer to completion.
During the recession, difficulties faced by some companies led to proposals
for amalgamation of working, at least within each of the Kimberley diamond mines.
Most of the stages in the 'struggle for control of the diamond industry' have not
been examined in detail by historians, and only the 'last stages ... have been
dealt with in any detail'.(26) The legendary (or perhaps mythological) battle
between Barnato and the Kimberley Central Company on one side, and Rhodes and the
De Beers Company on the other, has been the subject of a number of accounts and,
more recently, some demystification by Turrell.(27) It is not proposed to
describe the course of amalgamation in detail here, but the origins of the proc-
ess in the depression are worthy of mention, since the process itself contributed
to the availability of capital for investment elsewhere.
It was not long before depression encouraged attempts to improve the condi-
tions of the mines. J.B. Robinson, whose holdings were in companies which faced
severe difficulties, called a meeting of companies in July 1883 at which he
Table 1. Sample daily wages, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, 1883
I I I ' I
| | Cape Town | Port Elizabeth |
| | Coloured White | Coloured White |
I Carpenters & Joiners j 5/0 7/0 j ? 10/0 |
| Day labourers | 1/6 3/6 | 3/6 4/0 |
(Source: Cape Blue Book 1883)
argued for regulation of production. He was opposed by Rhodes, who wanted pro-
ducers to agree merely not to sell diamonds below an agreed floor price based on
the cost of production.(28) The companies which were able to produce in quantity
did not face a crisis of overproduction, contrary to the position espoused by
Turrell.(29) It was only with monopoly in sight that Rhodes, able to regulate
total output, reduced production to maintain market prices. In 1883 competition,
not monopoly, characterised the diamond trade, and low prices affected poor pro-
ducers more severely than companies like De Beers or the Compagnie Francaise.
The involvement of bankers in attempts to merge companies at Kimberley was
largely due to their desire to recover losses incurred through speculation in
poorer companies. For some, like Rothschild's, the. losses were direct (though
through European share markets); for others, in particular the Standard Bank, the
losses were indirect, through advances to share purchasers.(30) J.X. Merriman's
ideas on amalgamation gelled with those of the Standard Bank, and he spent
several months in early 1885 trying to negotiate a merger on behalf of the Stand-
ard Bank in Du Toit's Pan mine. When the scheme failed, Merriman acted as broker
for the Standard Bank's attempt on the Kimberley mine. The purpose was the.liqui-
dation of the Mining Board's debt of over £400 000. Through defaults by its deb-
tors the Cape of Good Hope Bank had come to control a portion of the mine, but
unlike the Standard was itself a debtor of the Mining Board. Opposition from the
Cape bank, together with that of Robinson and others involved in the mine, led to
another failure.(31)
Merriman failed a third and last time as amalgamation broker in the colossal
scheme for the 'Unified Diamond Mines Limited1. Once more this scheme was prima-
rily aimed at regulating production. As a result it was opposed by De Beers and
the Kimberley Central, though not by the Compagnie Francaise since its major
shareholders were involved in the Unified scheme as promoters. De Beers and the
Kimberley Central were engaged in the development of underground mining, and were
prepared to compete with the lesser producers by 'swamping them with pro-
duction' . (32) The inability of the promoters to draw the largest companies into
the 'Unified' led to its failure. Each of these schemes can be viewed as a
response to depression in the diamond industry.
The enormous reduction of diamond exports as the recession developed (cf.
Table 2) placed great strain on the commercial system of the Cape; imports fell
dramatically (Fig. 1) and government revenue suffered accordingly. The influx of
foreign capital both privately and publicly raised became constricted. While the
recession had first severely affected the western Cape, and then Kimberley, these
Table 2. Selected Cape Colony Exports 1880-1887 (£000).
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
Wool
lb(000)
42 468
42 771
41 690
38 029
37 270
34 433
47 454
44 758
f(000)
2430
2181
2062
1993
1745
1426
1581
1676
Ostrich feathers
lb(000)
163
194
254
247
233
251
289
269
£(000)
884
894
1094
931
966
585
546
366
Diamonds
i
carats
3140
3090
2660
2414
2264
2440
3135
3599
£(000)
3368
4176
3993
2742
2807
2490
3505
4242
(Sources: Cape Blue Book and Statistical Register 1880-1887;
Turrell, Capital ..., App. II.4)
further developments affected the Eastern Cape adversely, and Port Elizabeth in
particular.(33)
The failure of Barry and Nephews, large merchants of Swellendam and Cape Town
in July 1882, was a sign of the generalisation of the crisis. By the end of 1882,
one of the nine remaining local banks, the Cape Commercial, was in liquidation,
having sustained heavy losses -in . the Transvaal, .as... well .as during the ^ diamond .
share crash. Early in 1883, as the effects of years of drought were telling on
the Eastern Province, business declined in that region.(34)
Nevertheless, it was not until the collapse of wool and ostrich feather prices
in 1884 and 1885 that the recession in the Cape Colony plumbed its depths. The
northern hemisphere recession reduced the price of ostrich feathers from some £5
8s. per pound in 1880 to £2 6s. in 1885.(35) The long drought in the Eastern Pro-
vince led to deterioration in the quality of wool, ultimately affecting even the
best Border districts, so that by April 1885 both Port Elizabeth and East London
were in the grip of depression. What made matters worse was that farmers had sold
sheep and invested in ostriches; the ostrich industry had not been as profitable
as some had anticipated and the fall in the value of the birds affected farmers'
credit. Conditions had seemed at their worst in Cape Town in 1883, and although
an improvement in the 'tone' of business at Kimberley was reported in 1884, 1885
was the year of deepest depression.(36)
The crisis had now become general. The diamond mines had not recovered from
the slump (cf. Table 2); trade in the Western Province was considered 'very
poor'; discouraged by the lowest London wool prices in 35 years sellers withdrew
half their produce from colonial markets. Nevertheless, the turning point had
been reached. Although there was no rapid recovery, in 1886 most observers saw
improving trends. Insolvencies and sequestrations began falling rapidly in the
course of the year.(37) Improvement in the European wool market and good rains in
the Eastern province helped exports through Port Elizabeth to rise by eight per
cent. The Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce spoke of 'recovery' and the general
managers of the Standard Bank wrote in August 1886 that
Figure 1. Cape Colony imports and exports, 1880 - 1889
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(Source: Cape Blue Books and Statistical Registers 1880-1889)
The mining industry at Kimberley has recovered its position in a most
marked and gratifying manner since the commencement of the year.
With the elimination of so many weaker firms - culminating in the liquidation of
the South African Bank at Cape Town in March and the disappearance of associated
firms - the commercial system had been reformed.(38) The Cape Colony was on its
way to another boom. The new phase of expansion was to be more revolutionary than
any that had gone before.
Within the Cape Colony itself, one remarkable phenomenon associated with
recovery was the near-total amalgamation of diamond mining companies. Rhodes
made initial proposals for buying out the companies in the De Beers mine to the De
Beers Company board in January 1886. He had initially appeared to go along with
the Unified scheme, but perhaps used it as a cover for his own plans. Once the De
Beers proposals were published in February Merriman1s efforts disintegrated.(39)
Dropping its share exchange scheme De Beers proceeded to acquire other companies
mainly through purchase, and with the achievement of control in the Victoria Com-
pany via the London share market, became the first company wholly to own one of
the mines late in 1887. Going beyond their own mine, De Beers succeeded in
acquiring the Compagnie Francaise in Kimberley mine. The Central Company had
meanwhile absorbed the Standard, Kimberley United, North East and North Block
companies, and with its purchase of the De Beer's portion (ex-Compagnie
Francaise) acquired full control of Kimberley mine in November 1887.(40)
It was generally held that with the whole of the richer Kimberley mine in one
company, it was merely a matter of time before that concern would be able to
absorb Be Beers.(41) But Rhodes and his co-directors had prepared a number of
tactics which placed them in a superior position. In selling the French Company
back to the Central, they had been paid in Kimberley Central Company shares,
yielding a presence in that concern. It seems that some of the Central's direc-
tors had already agreed to join Rhodes, in particular Barnato, by the end of 1887.
With convict labour De Beers was able to work more cheaply than the Kimberley Cen-
tral Company. Its managers pushed the workers to the limit and beyond, culminat-
ing in the great fire disaster of 1888 in which over 200 miners died (the company
refused to shut down the mine for eight hours after the fire first broke out). By
these means they were able to maintain a high volume of production, generating
the profits necessary to attract European financial backing to enable De Beers
Company to acquire the Kimberley Central, rather than the other way around.(42)
The main amalgamations of diamond mining companies took place in 1886 and
1887, though the final consummation of the De Beers Consolidated only took place
in early 1889. By then the largest investments in South Africa were no longer
being made in the Cape, but in the Transvaal gold fields. The profits made by
numerous individuals in the process of amalgamations in Kimberley were redirected
northwards. The financial structures and experience available to those who had
control of amounts of money capital previously unheard of in the Cape allowed a
rapid movement of capital to take place in search of new opportunities. Invest-
ment opportunity was not the only attraction which led Kimberley capitalists to
look northwards during the eighteen eighties, however. Before considering the
antecedents of the shift of capital further into the interior those other forces,
which themselves affected the mobility of capital, require examination.
The Imperial Factor and Cape Expansion
The recession in the eighties followed a trajectory which steadily engulfed the
whole Cape Colony and much of the rest of South Africa in its toils. Among
responses to that recession were attempts both to restructure and to intensify
economic activity in the Cape, and to search for new sources for profit beyond the
colony. The economic environment within which such experiments were made had
been transformed by the communications system, the growth of towns, substantial
rural changes, and the beginnings of industrial diamond mining, as already
described. The political environment within which these varied endeavours were
conducted also differed substantially from that of the previous depression in the
sixties. The annexation of the Transvaal to Britain in 1877, the wars in Pedi
territory, Zululand, Basutoland and elsewhere, the entry of Portugal and Germany
as interested parties in southern Africa as well as internal changes such as the
emergence of the Afrikaner Bond as a political party provide examples of the
changes. The complex interplay of local and foreign economic interests with
South African and imperial politics conditioned the pace and character of north-
ward movement of people and capital from the Cape Colony. There was an enormous
increase in the area subjected to rule by the settler states, particularly the
Cape, or direct rule from London. At the same time this expansion was neither
even nor consistent. There were more advances than retreats, but there were nev-
ertheless withdrawals, both by British 'imperialism' and by Cape 'colonialism'
These two forces were sometimes in accord with one another and on occasion in con-
flict. The significance of this interplay was recognised by De Kiewiet in his
classic Imperial Factor in South Africa, and it has been elaborated more recently
by Schreuder.(43)
The coincidence of the 'imperial factor' with internal, mainly economic, forc-
es, has been stressed by Atmore and Marks. They do not go so far as to suggest
that the internal forces of 'colonialism' were always coincident with imperial
policy. There was enormous conflict within the Cape over imperial proposals for
confederation with other territories, over the annexation of the Transvaal, and
on the Basutoland, Transkei and Bechuanaland issues.(44) It was this pattern of
conflict, and the insistence on an autonomous role for the Cape in its own expan-
sion, which lent a complex appearance to the widening of colonial boundaries.
Both colonial and imperial policy and debate were informed by internal ques-
tions. Atmore and Marks and Etherington have demonstrated how imperial policy
was influenced by local officials' views on the labour needs of mines and farms.
Other recent literature has supplemented this analysis in helping to detail the
relationship between the mobility of labour and the 'imperial factor'.(45) These
studies form an exception to a singular gap within the literature on the 'imperi-
al factor' in South Africa between 1875 and 1885. This literature has generally
been silent on the internal economic forces at work, not so much in terms of their
own coincidence or otherwise with imperial politics, but with a view to their own
dynamics of expansion. The main events of 'political' expansion and contraction
must be considered in relation to their economic context.
Whatever the chemistry of the confederation policy initiated by the British
colonial secretary, Carnarvon, in 1875, the question of economy of administration
was certainly among its elements.(46) Carnarvon's fears that the costs of
divided colonies faced with disrupted and therefore hostile indigenous popu-
lations on all sides would be very large, were justified over the next few years.
He noted the 'danger of widely extended disaffection' among African polities in
his well-known confederation dispatch to the Cape Governor, Barkly, in May 1875.
Other prompting factors were the express fears of Griqualand West (and. Natal)
officials over labour supplies.(47) As Kimble has pointed out, migrant labour
depended on the 'conditions prevailing at both the point of supply and that of
demand1.(48) Conditions in the Transvaal seemed to threaten that supply. The
refusal of the Cape government to participate in the proposed conference on con-
federation; the arbitration award of Delagoa Bay to Portugal in July 1875; the
financial weakness of the republican government; the unsuccessful republican war
against the Pedi in 1876; all strengthened imperial resolve. In April 1877 Bri-
tain annexed the Transvaal.(49)
There was a strong commercial lobby in the Cape Colony in favour of Transvaal
annexation. That republic had first been viewed as a potential source of sub-
stantial wealth during the seventies. Apart from labour migration which under-
pinned the diamond fields, gold discoveries in the Eastern Transvaal proved
payable and attracted attention. A commentator at the Cape in 1875 held that
The whole course of past, recent and passing events seem to indicate, with
a probability nearly amounting to certainty, that a few years, indeed, will
see the Transvaal territory occupy a most important position in South Afri-
ca. (50)
Cape colonists held extensive interests in the Orange Free State and in the Tran-
svaal. At least one Cape bank had investments in the Transvaal. Through lending
£60 000 to the government of President Burgers, the Cape Commercial Bank had been
allowed to open branches in the republic in the early seventies. The financial
problems of the Burgers government led the bank to press for the annexation in
1876.(51) Once it occurred, Cape-based financial interests were not far behind.
On May 2, 1877, the Standard opened in Potchefstroom, and on May 16 in Pretoria.
The imperial bank, kept out of the Orange Free State since 1868, was eagerly
awaiting the chance to enter the new British territory.(52) Reflecting these
financial links, the telegraph system was extended from the Cape through the
Orange Free State and into the Transvaal, the line to Pretoria being opened at the
beginning of 1880.(53)
While the Cape government was not enthusiastic about the annexation, which
helped to stimulate the rise of a Dutch-speaking political movement in the colo-
ny, it was not averse to territorial expansion. Labour supplies, the prospect of
'unrest' and the expansion of trade all encouraged the Port Elizabeth Chamber of
Commerce to press for the annexation of the Transkeian territories in the
mid-seventies.
We believe it would be wise of Her Majesty's Government to ... (annex) . . .
the tribes and their country lying between Natal and the (Cape) colony.
The long unsettled condition and warlike desires of the natives have seri-
ously retarded the advancement of public works, greatly increased the rise
in wages, the cost of living, and the public expenditure for internal pro-
tection and frontier defence, and made it necessary for the government at
the Cape to confer with Parliament now in Session how best to provide
against a native uprising and against attempts at invasion.(54)
The adoption of a more 'vigorous' policy towards Africans in the borderlands of
the Cape - Ciskei, Transkei, and Basutoland - included the passage in 1877 of a
'Permissive Act' providing for Transkeian annexation. More ominously, Sprigg's
government - brought to power by the governor's dismissal of Molteno, and dis-
posed to expansionism - began to pursue a policy of disarmament of Africans. It
was partly successful in the Border area but disastrous in Basutoland. 'Disturb-
ances' led to war in 1877-78 within the colony and beyond the Kei; parts of the
Transkei and the large and productive area of Griqualand East were annexed. By
contrast, the 'gun war' against Basotho chiefdoms in 1880-81 was enormously
expensive and quite without rewards. The. Cape had agreed to take on Griqualand
West, which had a large public debt, in 1880; but the needs of 'economy' led to a
retreat: a temporary cessation of annexation across the Kei, and the return of
Basutoland to the" status; of., a. British protectorate r^ wher-fi' the .chiefs.maintained .
declining powers - in 1884.(55)
This setback for Cape expansionism coincided with the defeats of British forc-
es in the Transvaal; Gladstone's government rediscovered its electoral intentions
and the independence of that republic was restored by negotiation in late 1881.
Both imperialism and Cape colonialism entered the eighties in retreat. The link-
age between these setbacks and the recession has been mentioned in the first sec-
tion of this paper. But this was not the end of expansionist designs in the Cape.
The same forces which had encouraged the former officials of Griqualand West to
look northwards were still present: labour migration from the Transvaal and ter-
ritories to its west and north continued to maintain the diamond fields. With a
gathering recession in the early eighties, the smooth passage of that labour to
and from the fields was crucial to its cost. Politicians from Kimberley were
vociferous in their concern to secure the 'road to the north'.
Immediately north of the Vaal River and within a relatively short distance of
Kimberley lay a territory which had been disputed for decades. The emergence of
two small republics in the area complicated the passage of labour from the north,
and posed a threat to the labour supplies of the Kimberley mineowners. Rhodes,
one of the four new Griqualand West, representatives elected to the Cape parlia-
ment in 1881, told the House of Assembly in a pitch designed to gain merchants'
support:
I look upon this Bechuanaland territory as the Suez Canal of the trade of
this country, the key of its road to the interior. (56)
On the recall of the British resident in Bechuanaland, Rhodes managed to gain the
appointment to this post in August 1884. (57) Within six months a new boundary had
10
been fixed for the Transvaal, the area between Griqualand West and the Molopo
River had become a British crown colony, and the rest of Bechuanaland was a Brit-
ish protectorate. The road to the north was in British hands.
The change had been brought about by a number of factors. Maylara stresses the
strategic motive: control of the interior was necessary to British retention of
the coast and its supposed command of the route to India. A further element is
said to have been the apparent threat of German occupation of the vast territory
inland of what is now the Namibian coast, as well as a general concern in the. 'of-
ficial mind' with Portuguese and South African Republic expansionism.(58) While
Schreuder claims that 'the German factor was not yet involved1,(59) almost the
whole coastline of South West Africa was annexed to Germany in August 1884, and
recognised as German territory by Britain in September - the month in which
Rhodes became involved in Bechuanaland and sought troops to help secure control.
If the direct impact of the German action was limited, it certainly helped to
increase concern over the future of Bechuanaland in the Cape Colony. Schreuder
himself has pointed out that the Cape's trade with the territories accessed by
Rhodes's 'Suez Canal of the country' was worth more than £250 000 a year. The
colony's merchants were also deeply involved in South West Africa, which had
motivated a struggle to exclude Germany from the territory and in the course of
which Merriman had even suggested a 'precolonizing chartered company' to Rhodes.
It was Cape politicians and commercial groups, unable to pay the cost of militar-
ism themselves, who pressured Britain to provide the 4000 troops of the Warren
expedition which resulted in the creation of a crown colony to the south of the
Molopo, and a protectorate beyond.(60)
In the course of the early eighties commercial interests in the Cape had
sought to expand into new territories yet again, but their prospects were limited
by at least two political considerations. One was the German annexation in South
West Africa, which operated to excdude colonial .traders fx.pnt the_ concessions and
commercial rights they had sought with the indigenous people. The other was the
resumption of Transvaal independence. The latter served to discourage Cape
investment immediately, especially under the nationalist aura of the monopoly
concessions granted by the republican government.(61) The Cape Commercial Bank
had succumbed to the added pressure which diamond share lending had placed,on it,
but primarily to its earlier and continuing losses in the Transvaal, and went
into liquidation in 1882. The Standard Bank pursued a policy of reducing its
business in the republic from 1881 to 1883. By the latter date, however, the Cape
recession had taken its toll in turn of the Western Province and Kimberley, and
was clearly weakening business in the Eastern Province as well. Political condi-
tions in the Transvaal were judged to be less problematic than Cape merchants had
previously thought - perhaps in comparison with the economic problems of the 'old
colony1 where 'new large failures' were reported from Cape Town. It was with the
beginnings of 'gold mania' in that territory that interest in its potential for
expansion was renewed. By mid-June 1883 the Standard Bank was proposing to reo-
pen its closed branches in the Transvaal.(62) An economic rather than strictly
political expansion to the north was once more underway.
In this renewed expansion of colonial capitalism into the Transvaal in the
eighties, it was forces largely internal to the Cape which engineered the move-
ment of capital in that direction. It is thus to the interplay of those forces
and their relationships in the further interior that the last section of this
paper is devoted.
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Protection and Prospecting
In the first part of this paper the course of the recession in the Cape was out-
lined. It was noted that the impact of this recession was considered to be deeper
than that of the sixties. The economy in the eighties was, of course, larger in
scale and quicker in pace; it had a far more complex structure, with companies in
Kimberley beginning to play a role unthought of years earlier, and government
involvement through railways in particular being an entirely new factor. The
Cape's economy had become more deeply inserted into foreign trade, and at the
same time more diversified. As the slump deepened, a new range of responses both
possible and realised was therefore to be expected. Nevertheless, in broad terms
those responses can be treated once more as contributing either to the geograph-
ical intensification or to the spatial expansion of economic activity. In either
event, it was the nature of the response which would shape the development of the
colony in the boom which followed. Outward expansionist responses will be con-
sidered in the light of attempts to intensify economic activity within the Cape
and their outcomes, which are discussed first.
The recession affected farmers in the Cape particularly severely; in many
respects it was caused by the decline in rural production, which in turn caused
storekeepers, port merchants and banks to shorten credit, particularly after the
losses sustained in the collapse of diamond share mania. The combined effects of
poor seasons, falling prices and restricted credit produced a large number of
insolvencies among Western Cape wheat farmers in particular. As the Argus put
it,
The immediate causes of these agricultural insolvencies are twofold - pres-
sure from the storekeepers, who in turn have been pressured by the town
merchants, and unexpected pressure from the banks.(63)
Farmers in the Cape were not unorganised. Hofmeyr's Farmers' Protection Associ-
ation increasingly merged with the more nationalist Afrikaner Bond in the early
eighties.(64) The Bond, apart from preparing to support candidates at the
elections, began to organise on an economic front too. The banks were viewed as a
major cause of distress among farmers; the easiest target among them was the
Standard Bank, the largest and besides, British-based. The government was criti-
cised for maintaining an exclusive account with the Standard, for this was held
to divert funds from banks more disposed to support farmers, such as the South
African Bank in Cape Town and the surviving district banks in the Western Prov-
ince. The Standard Bank was accused of 'draining the country'.(65) Partly in
response to these attacks, the Standard Bank changed its name in early 1883,
dropping the 'British' from its full title. (66)
The Bond employed more than rhetoric alone on economic issues. In an attempt
to expand credit available to farmers, Bond branches tried to sponsor new local
banks. At Stellenbosch the old local bank was revived as the Stellenbosch Dis-
trict Bank, which was well-supported in that wealthy farming area and survived
into the twentieth century. In outlying districts where the necessary financial
support was limited, such attempts were less successful. The Hopetown Boer Bank,
for example, opened in mid-1882 but had collapsed by the end of the year. (67)
One of the central problems faced by farmers was the expense of transport
especially away from the railway lines, a phenomenon which militated against com-
peting with imported wheat and otherwise hampered their attempts to deal with the
slump. Insolvencies in the Western agricultural districts had reached their peak
in 1882, and the wealthier farmers pressed for railway building to help restore
prosperity. Appeals for branch lines were to become a 'hardy annual1.(68) In the
face of falling revenue the colonial government was not prepared to countenance
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new schemes: even the line to Kimberley was not sanctioned until the imperial
government provided a guarantee. As a result, the only railway proposal to win
approval in the early eighties was a private scheme to build a a line from Worces-
ter down the Brede River valley to Ashton. With the support of the Bond a bill
providing for a government subsidy to be paid on completion of this line was
approved in 1883, and a company was floated in London to carry out the work. The
43 mile line was not completed until 1887, however. (69)
The 'plight' of Cape farmers formed the focus of much political debate during
the recession. Scanlen's ministry, which had replaced Sprigg's government in
1881, suffered a setback in the 1883-84 elections and finally resigned over an
apparently minor defeat in May 1884. Embattled over his Transkei and Bechuana-
land policies, which were opposed by the Bond, Scanlen's ministry was censured
for partially lifting an embargo on plant imports. The purpose of the
restriction was to prevent further contamination by the vine disease phylloxera,
but the Bond's core in the wine districts was not convinced that the amendments
were safe.(70) However 'minor' the issue might have appeared to later historians,
it captures the concern of the Bond with the situation of Cape farmers during the
depression.
It was in this context of depression that the issue of protection for colonial
producers arose.(71) In part this related to existing interests: it was agricul-
tural, not industrial protection which was mooted at the Bond congress in 1882.
Thus the Bond expressed concern over imported liquor which threatened Cape brandy
producers, particularly given competition both within the colony and from the
protectionist South African Republic. Moreover, Cape farmers found it difficult
to compete with cereals imported from Australia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and the
Orange Free State. De Waal, a Bondsman representing Piquetberg, moved in parlia-
ment for higher import duties on grain and flour in 1885.(72)
It was not only with respect to agriculture that protection was sought in the
Cape. One reason for interest in. manufacturing industry was the fear that as in
the sixties a proportion of the Cape's white population would emigrate. Noting
that import duties on raw materials were often higher than on finished products,
a select committee on colonial agriculture and industries recommended tariff
changes and a system of bonuses to encourage the establishment of manufacturing
in the colony. The committee included a number of Bond representatives (Hofmeyr,
De Villiers and Marais).(73)
Manufacturing was particularly undeveloped in the Cape at the time. The Sta-
tistical Register for 1883 listed hundreds of 'manufactories and works', but few
employed more than a handful of workers.(74) Several witnesses to the 1883
select committee urged various forms of government assistance.to industrial
development. For example, a senior railway official recommended the establish-
ment of a scrap iron mill at the coal fields in the Albert district, through which
the Border railway passed. Merchants, however, tended ,to oppose protection of
industry; Searle, president of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, was opposed to
protection generally, while Twentyman, a Cape Town merchant, held that
If commodities can be imported cheaper than they can be made here, I should
say that they should be imported.
The recommendations of the committee were hardly 'protectionist1; the limited
system of bonuses was the strongest encouragement proposed for manufacturers.(75)
In any event no legislation was introduced to implement the bonus system.
The Afrikaner Bond always maintained an ambivalent attitude to protection and
assistance for colonial industries. With a constituency mainly of farmers, and
13
to a degree of merchants and financiers in the towns, the increases in taxation
and the probable rise in commodity prices which could be expected to result from
protectionist policies were counterposed by the 'nationalist' position which the
Bond tended to adopt. The new member for Grahamstown, Douglass, introduced a
motion calling for protective duties on a series of commodities. On being sup-
ported by the Bond the motion was carried, but the threatened resignation of
Upington's government required its dilution.(76) When the House of Assembly
adopted a resolution in favour of bonuses for manufacturers in July 1885 it was
not at the instigation of the Bond, and it was opposed by merchants' represen-
tatives such as Barry. One of its authors was again Douglass, whose interests in
ostrich farming had been devalued by recession and who hoped for benefits from
the government not only for manufacturers but also in the experimental agricul-
ture in which he, among others, was interested. Cotton, olive oil, rope fibre and
silk were among the products whose cultivation he wished to see rewarded. Once
more, although the resolution was adopted by the House and supported by Sprigg,
Treasurer at the time, legislation was not introduced to provide for its imple-
mentation. (77)
The subject of industrial protection reappeared in parliament in 1886 and by
that time elicited still less interest from the government. Far from advocating
protection, merchants in Port Elizabeth were pleading for customs duty rebates on
traffic in transit to the northern republics to meet competition from Natal
importers.(78) It was partly this competition which discouraged a colonial
response to Orange Free State President Brand's call for a customs conference to
negotiate a sharing of coastal revenue with his state. (79) In the Cape the Bond
was playing an increasingly powerful role and although its acknowledged leader,
Hofmeyr, was not a minister, it was widely believed that he 'held the whole Minis-
try in his hands'. Hofmeyr had spoken against protection in 1885, and no great
enthusiasm greeted a renewed protectionist motion from Douglass in 1886.(80)
With easier credit being ^ allowed once more by merchants^ the, issue-o.f^  protection ,
for agriculture was silenced for several years. The slump had not turned the col-
ony towards a more intensive development of its own productive resources in agri-
culture or industry.
Another opportunity for colonial production to which attention was turned dur-
ing the depression was mineral resources. A wide variety of mines and quarries
opened in the early eighties; new equipment was imported and installed. For
example, a manganese mine in Du Toit's Kloof, near Paarl, was reopened during
1883-JL884. (81) More significant was the development of coal mining in the Cape
Colony. There were two main sources of the burgeoning demand for fuel: the gov-
ernment railways and the mines at Kimberley. At the diamond mines the high and
increasing cost of fuel coupled with falling diamond prices led mineowners to
seek sources of cheaper fuel. The lack of local coal had forced the use of tim-
ber, and for up to a hundred miles in all directions the sparse tree cover of the
area around Kimberley had been completely destroyed.(82) Before the recession
had bitten deeply at Kimberley, about 30% of working expenditure in companies
using steam machinery was on fuel. The search for coal which could be transported
cheaply to the diamond fields led to the formation of a company to work coal mines
in the Orange Free State. Rhodes and Rudd of De Beers were on the board of the
Kimberley Coal Mining Company, which hoped to deliver coal to Kimberley by wagon
at a few pounds a ton. Poor resources of coal in the Winburg district where the
company planned to mine were one source of its failure, although other Transvaal
and Free State coals were being used 'extensively' at Kimberley in 1882.(83)
The existence of coal in the Stormberg series of the north-eastern Cape had
been known for some time but supplies at Kimberley were erratic. Colonial coal
was competitive for use in stationary steam engines, although it was usually only
about 65% as efficient as English coal, since in 1881 it cost approximately £12
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per ton at the diamond fields as opposed to £17 10s. for the imported article. (84)
The chief difficulty was the unreliable and costly nature of its production and
transport.
In late 1881 and early 1882 several companies were floated to work the coal of
the Stormberg area. An incentive in this connection was the construction of the
railway from Queenstown northwards. 'These companies included the Cyphergat,
Great Stormberg, Indwe and Paarde Kraal Coal Companies. Some fared better than
others. By 1884 only the Cyphergat and Indwe companies survived, and only the
Cyphergat company, whose property was on the railway, was producing coal.(85)
The existence of the coal mines led to pressure on the Cape government to use
colonial coal on the railways, to reduce the rates on its transport and to build a
'junction' line between the Eastern and Midland railway systems.(86) Trials of
Cyphergat coal were carried out, and its use was gradually adopted on the Eastern
system. But the tight finances of the government militated against building a
junction line. Cyphergat is about 220 miles from Kimberley; Indwe was a week's
journey by ox wagon even from the Eastern railway. With the completion of the
railway to the Orange River in 1884 and to Kimberley in 1885, the cost of imported
English or Welsh coal was cut in half at Kimberley. Fuel costs in the diamond
mines dropped to about 16% of working expenditure. It was not until the nineties
that colonial coal again became competitive anywhere beyond the Eastern railway,
after the completion of the junction to the other systems.(87)
If the greater exploitation of colonial coal was prevented by government
inaction (or inability to act), there were other avenues open both to individuals
and to companies to pursue mineral ambitions. As in the sixties, attention was
easily turned to precious metals in the 1880s. Very little is known of prospect-
ing in the Cape during this period, but it certainly occurred. A new feature was
that it depended less on individual actions than before. Reports of gold in Nama-,
qualand, along the Swartberg and in the Ceres district encouraged the formation
of prospecting companies in the early eighties. For some reason Worcester seems
to have given rise to at least six such companies by 1883.(88) The survival of
the local bank in Worcester, which played a central role in the flotation of a
number of later companies involved in the Witwatersrand gold fields is perhaps a
clue to the channeling of local capital into these ventures. Among other towns
where gold prospecting became more than merely a topic of conversation was
Oudtshoorn, where a company was formed in 1883 to prospect in the Knysna area.
Exploration in the Cape was not entirely without rewards, for gold was discovered
near Knysna in the mid-eighties, and was worked on a small scale later in the dec-
ade. (89)
It was during 1883, as the deepening recession spread to Kimberley and threat-
ened to engulf the entire colony, that the Standard Bank remarked on an increase
in speculation in the Cape. The reason for this turn of events was not success in
finding new payable minerals in the Cape Colony. It was the continuing growth of
rumours of the mineral wealth of the Transvaal.(90)
There had already been a number of minor gold 'scrambles' in the Transvaal,
and one event which could be described as a small gold 'rush' . In the speculative
period beginning in 1883 remarked on above, companies were floated to work the
Lydenburg gold area, but failed 'to answer expectations'. It was the discovery
of the Pioneer Reef on Moodie's farm in the Kaap Valley that initiated the more
rapid development of the Transvaal gold fields.(91) Thorough prospecting in the
Kaap Valley turned up numerous sources of gold, including the Sheba mine; compa-
nies were floated in Natal and the Cape Colony and a large variety of people set
off to investigate the prospects of the new - and the older - gold fields to the
north.
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In early 1884 Cape interests were involved in ventures like the Transvaal Gold
Company, formed to work at Pilgrim's Rest and in the Kaap fields. Leading mer-
chants such as Ebden of Dunnell, Ebden and Co. were interested in properties such
as the Ceylon mine in the Eastern Transvaal. The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce
was 'watching the gold fields in the Transvaal with great interest and anxiety1.
Among the pressures encouraging this interest in Transvaal minerals were the long
drought in the Eastern Province, and the prospect of the 'gold connection1 being
monopolised by Durban merchants, who were geographically much closer to the Kaap
gold fields than any of the Cape ports. There was also the possibility that Dela-
goa Bay in Portuguese territory and closest port of all to the new goldfields
would capture much Transvaal trade. (92) In March 1884 the Standard Bank noted
that
Reports from the gold fields continue to excite much interest and organised
parties to proceed to the Transvaal are in course of formation at Port Eli-
zabeth, East London and other centres.(93)
The willingness of the Standard Bank to extend credit on Transvaal activities had
been increasing in 1883, as noted above, and its attitude continued to change in
favour of business there in early 1884. Despite signs of recovery, the
depression in the Cape continued into 1885 and with the 'falling off' of trade at
Port Elizabeth and East London more and more people were encouraged to look else-
where for opportunities.(94)
It was not only in the Cape that the prospects of payable minerals in the Tran-
svaal were receiving increasing attention. About three quarters of the gold
exported from South Africa between 1882 and 1886 went through Natal, not the Cape
Colony. When Moodie's farms were sold into a company with a nominal capital of a
quarter of a million pounds in 1883, the flotation was in Pietermaritzburg, the
Natal capital. Vigorous prospecting by Natal-based interests was responsible for
several of the 'finds' in the Kaap area. Nevertheless, most shares in companies
operating in the Transvaal were, according to the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce,
held in the Cape.(95)
At least two small companies formed to prospect in the Witwatersrand area
acquired farms between 1882 and 1884. The first stamp battery for rock crushing
in the vicinity of the Witwatersrand was installed on a local farm in June
1885.(96) One of the sources of credit for these prospectors on the Witwatersrand
was the Standard Bank. It was thus to the Bank that the Strubens sent the first
sixty ounces of gold extracted from crushing conglomerate in February 1886.(97)
The significance of this new development - gold had nowhere been extracted from
rock of this type before - was not yet apparent, however.
Attention was thus readily diverted to the share boom at Barberton in the Kaap
fields, where, following in the footsteps of Cape investors - including his
brother - one of the general managers of the Standard Bank, L.L. Michell, opened a
new branch in April 1886.(98) It has been observed above that from 1883 people
and money from the Cape were involved in the Barberton area. The most successful
were perhaps S. Marks and I. Lewis, Kimberley storekeepers and claimholders who
had merged their diamond claims into the Compagnie Francaise in 1880. In 1881
they had been bought out, and with their proceeds had purchased farms on the Tran-
svaal bank of the Vaal River from where they supplied firewood to Kimberley. They
were among the first to sell coal from the vicinity of the Vaal River to Kimberley
in 1882. Through trading Lewis and Marks acquired a large area of land in the
Transvaal, and were among the company promoters active in Barberton in 1886.
Their investments spread into the building boom in the town. Their greatest for-
tune, however, was to be involved in the promotion of the Sheba Gold Mining Compa-
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ny, which proved to be the only really productive mine in the Kaap Valley. (99) In
the boom of 1886,
£1 shares rose to over £100 ... while shares in other Barberton mines, on
which absolutely no work had been done, rose to twenty or thirty times
their nominal value. Disappointment and ruin naturally followed.(100)
The money which produced this boom came primarily from the coastal colonies, and
through them, in late 1886 and early 1887, from London. The involvement of J.X.
Merriman at Barberton illustrates the nature of the process. A syndicate was
formed in Cape Town and Merriman went to Barberton to represent it there. Fooled
by faked gold panning, he recommended the purchase of the Gem mine to his backers.
They floated a company which paid £80 000 for the property. In March rumours
spread that no gold had been found and the shares became worthless soon after-
wards. (101) Cape Town merchants were also involved in the Highland Reef Gold Min-
ing Company, formed to work a mine near Barberton in 1886. Companies were also
formed in other towns in the Cape to invest at Barberton. In 1886 several direc-
tors of the Stellenbosch District Bank were involved in the Ophir Gold Mining
Company, while the Union and the Thomas Reef Gold Mining Companies - the latter
with a paid-up capital of £170 000 largely subscribed by merchants such as H.
Christian, Salomon, and Dunnell - were floated in Port Elizabeth.(102) Once
again, money capital was being siphoned from Cape investors into the interior.
Much of the investment in Barberton came from Kimberley, as indicated by names
such as the Kimberley Imperial Gold Mining Company. While Barnato and other Kim-
berley interests had been involved in investigations of the Eastern Transvaal
gold fields in 1882, the depression in Kimberley initially focussed attention on
restructuring labour control, techniques of production and finances in diamond
mining. It was through the agency of those who, like Lewis and Marks, were forced
or bought out of the diamond mines that resources from Kimberley began to enter
the Transvaal. The trickle flowed more swiftly with the Barberton boom. "During
1886 the smaller mineowners' resources were increased by rising share prices and
their ability to sell out on the wave of amalgamations. The proceeds, originat-
ing in Kimberley and European funds channelled through share markets, often found
their way to the Transvaal. A record of this process exists in the letters of
Hermann Eckstein, diamond merchant, representative of London interests and manag-
er of the Phoenix Diamond Mining Company, written from Kimberley in the second
half of 1886.
Speculating in the shares of companies which were prime amalgamation pros-
pects, Eckstein realised 'suitable profits' and took out claims at Barberton in
July and August 1886. He participated in the flotation of Barberton companies,
writing to an agent that
I need hardly tell you that with my connections both here and abroad I can
insure (sic) success to the undertaking.(103)
Eckstein felt that the best speculative opportunities at Barberton had passed by
August, but by that time new possibilities were opening for investment and specu-
lation on the Witwatersrand, which he had visited en route to Barberton in Sep-
tember. (104)
Samples of Witwatersrand gold and of conglomerate ore began to reach Kimberley
in mid-1886. In June, a Kimberley merchant named Alexander travelling in the
Transvaal acquired some samples from Bantjes. Back in Kimberley he had the rock
crushed and invited some 'prominent Kimberley men' to see a panning on 16 July
1886. The Barberton boom and developments in Kimberley itself still occupied the
attention of many involved in diamond mining. But some who had been severely
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affected by the recession had become interested in the potential of the Witwa-
tersrand. One was J.B. Robinson.(105)
Robinson had few liquid assets in 1886. He was deeply indebted to the Cape of
Good Hope Bank. He had tried to secure support from the Standard Bank and from
Cape Town sources without success. On the basis of gold prospects in the Tran-
svaal, he appears to have formed a syndicate with Beit and an old associate, Mar-
cus, in July 1886. With about £20 000 from Beit, who was profiting extensively
from his role in the diamond mine amalgamation process, Robinson proceeded to the
Witwatersrand in late July, and purchased a number of farms. This was the first
significant infusion of money from the Cape colony to the Witwatersrand gold
fields.
Much of the literature on the origins of mines, companies and towns on the Wit-
watersrand professes surprise at the 'slowness' with which Kimberley or other
Cape capitalists developed an interest in the Witwatersrand.(106) Roberts, 1972,
pp. . 224, 249; Cartwright, 1965, p. 5). This view suggests that what has to be
explained is why the response in the Cape was slow, whereas from the point of view
of the Cape Colony, the more rewarding enquiry is into why, and how, it came about
at all. At the same time the effects of the gold discoveries are taken to have
been almost instantaneous on the whole economy of southern Africa. From the
sketch presented here, the history of varied but quickening interest within the
Cape Colony in the productive possibilities of the Transvaal can be seen to have
developed over a long period. Particularly during the depression of the eighties
this interest gained intensity in the Cape. It focussed on Pilgrim's Rest, Bar-
berton, and only then on the 'Rand' (Witwatersrand). Furthermore, when the Rand
gold fields were first proclaimed, in September 1886, the majority of Cape specu-
lators or investors were still involved in the Barberton boom. It was only at the
end of 1886 that financial community attention in the Cape was increasingly
focussed on the Rand.
By that time large areas on the Witwatersrand had been purchased by Robinson
on behalf of his syndicate, by Beit on his visit in September, by Rhodes and Rudd
during August, and by others. The amount of actual mining remained limited, and
the new town of Johannesburg was the centre of speculation, claim and land deals
and promotion. (107) Barberton was still the gold town of the Transvaal. Never-
theless, as interest increasingly turned to the Rand, the Standard Bank's caution
gave way to a desire to open an office there. As rumours spread of the fickleness
of Barberton's riches, companies began to be formed in the coastal colonies (and
particularly at Kimberley) to purchase claims and (in some cases) to work Rand
gold. Among the earliest were the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company, formed in
Kimberley in September 1886 with a capital of over £200 000 to acquire a farm and
64 claims on the main reef; the Jubilee Gold Mining Company, formed in Natal in
December 1886; and the Vierfontein Farm and Gold Mining Company, formed by mer-
chants in Kingwil liamstown in the Eastern Cape in January 1887 to acquire proper-
ty near the Rand gold outcrops, and for exploration, in January 1887.(108) The
crash at Barberton came in mid-1887, when mining authorities reporting to Kimber-
ley, such as J.B. Taylor, demonstrated the worthlessness of many properties
there.
Never previously at Kimberley nor subsequently at the Rand was there any-
thing like the number of bogus flotations that there was in Barberton.(109)
From that time on the number of Rand gold mining companies formed in the Cape, and
the amount of money capital subscribed, rose very rapidly. Apart from the compa-
nies formed at Kimberley in 1887 (for example, the Bantjes Reef, Evelyn, Roodep-
oort, Wemmer and Wolhuter Gold Mining Companies), groups in various other
colonial towns were eagerly engaged in share purchasing and company flotation.
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The Paarl Ophir Gold Mining Company was registered in Cape Town in 1887 with a
capital of £10 000; on a larger scale the Worcester Exploration and Gold Mining
Company, on the board of which were, several local farmers, merchants and direc-
tors of the Worcester Commercial Bank, was floated with a capital of flOO 000.
Those already in the Transvaal could count on Cape investors as subscribers to
new companies, as the origins of the Cape-Transvaal Gold Mining Association and
the Paarl-Pretoria Gold Mining Company reveal. The National Gold Mining Company
of Paarl, with a capital of £120 000, was controlled by Kimberley emigres in
Johannesburg. Almost all of these companies were formed through the sale of
claims into them, the vendors taking payment in shares and the cash subscribed by
share purchasers going sometimes into the purchase of machinery and equipment for
the development of the mines and, more often than not, to the credit of successful
speculators. Whichever outcome resulted, the overall impact was to withdraw an
enormous sum of money capital from the Cape to the Transvaal, probably reaching
several million pounds in the first few years of Rand gold mines.(110) The
depression had prepared the conditions for a rapid transfer of money capital to
the north; persistent effort, largely financed from the Cape, produced the
results of new gold fields, and capital flowed to this new and attractive invest-
ment opportunity.
By comparison, new companies floated to pursue activities within the Colony
were scarce. Colonial gold rumours aroused their own interest, and on the
strength of early speculation in South African mining shares in 1887, local com-
panies were able to attract foreign capital to the Knysna area (as in the case of
the London Knysna Gold Prospecting Association, floated in London in 1887). A
few companies were formed in connection with agricultural interests in the West-
ern Cape, such as the Paarl Berg Wijn, Brandewijn en Spiritus Maatschappij in
1885, and the Colonial Brandy Company at Worcester in 1887. In Port Elizabeth a
group of merchants floated a company to work the Zwartkops salt pan in 1887.
Kingwilliamstown interests invested through the Kaffrarian Steam Mill Company
(1887) in the expansion of productive activity in the area - not least with an eye
to the Witwatersrand market as its growth raised prices for colonial pro-
duce. (Ill)
All these Cape companies were small in comparison with the sums invested in
the flight of money capital from the Cape to the Transvaal. A substantial move-
ment of people as well as money was also developing. The emigration which had
been in evidence during the recession was now more clearly a northward movement
towards the Transvaal - a movement of what the Standard Bank's general managers
saw as a 'redundant population'. Perhaps insofar as recession had rendered it
so, this was not an inaccurate description. Farmers in the northern districts of
the colony again turned to transport riding with oxen and wagons: not since the
Western and Midland railway systems had been linked at De Aar had so large a
potential traffic presented itself as the burgeoning import trade of the Tran-
svaal. (112)
In 1885 and 1886, the Cape Colony's economy had begun to quicken. In a public
lecture in 1886, James Easton, an official of the Cape government, remarked that
we are all, Micawber-like, waiting for something to turn up; the Colony's
eyes are on the Knysna Gold Fields and the boring operations for the dis-
covery of coal.(113)
Apart from diamonds and copper, coal appeared to provide the best opportunity for
mineral development within the Cape. In mid-1886, prior to their first mention
of the Witwatersrand gold fields in their London correspondence, the general man-
agers of the Standard Bank were intrigued by samples of coal from the Eastern Pro-
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vince, which they hoped might augur the development of new colonial industry.
With gold 'turning up' in the Transvaal, this hope receded:
Colonial coal field development is likely to be retarded by the excitement
attaching to gold.(114)
The recession had produced diverse responses, but none was more marked than the
northward search for profitable opportunities. With the efflux of capital to the
Transvaal, new opportunities did indeed become available. They involved a
geographical expansion of what was still essentially a commercial economy in the
Cape, rather than an intensification of development in the colony itself.
The last section of this paper has examined, in the context of depression in
the early eighties, the forces affecting the Cape's economy making for internal
intensification on one hand and external economic expansion on the other.. The
failure of attempts at intensification through new internal railway development,
local banking, coal mining and protection of colonial production has been
reviewed. The forces of expansionism, encouraged by the 'imperial factor' and
generated by internal political developments as well as the concentration of cap-
ital in Kimberley and the problems of commercial communities, became dominant
during the depression. The immediate result was a probing of the potential of
territories to the north, particularly the Transvaal. The restructuring of the
colonial economy produced by the recession was thus extended to a northward reo-
rientation of trade and investment. In the longer term these forces of geograph-
ical expansion involved the Cape inextricably in the new industries of the South
African Republic.
Gold mining in South Africa did not develop 'consistently' from the early sev-
enties (contra Richardson and Van-Helten, 1980, p. 18). The early exploration"
and development of the. Barberton-..- and^ W^.i"fcwat.ers.rand_.-goidilif.ieilds_;_musiz.-be. cpJLacfij&=.
against the background of the recession in the entire area, and particularly in
the Cape Colony. Recession did not simply produce a condition of 'waiting for
something to turn up', as Easton put it. It spurred a variety of responses, some
directed to internal investment, others to geographical expansion of the economy.
As in the sixties, the economy of the 'old colony1 had already begun to pick up
prior to the excitement of precious minerals. But in the eighties, there were
important differences. The concentration of capital, particularly at Kimberley
but also elsewhere in the colony, meant that the diversion of capital to the Tran-
svaal was more rapid and more decisive than that to Kimberley had been. The
results of these new developments were thus more immediate, more dramatic than
the story of the diamond industry. Within a decade and a half, they proved cata-
clysmic.
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